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LEGA.L PUBLICATIONS BOARD
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CHARLES B. ROBISON, Case Editor

FEDERAL JURISDICTION -IMMUNITY FROM STATE PROSECUTION.-

[Federal]
A troublesome problem of conflict of jurisdiction
between the state and federal
courts arises where an accused has
been tried and convicted by one
court and is then sought by the
other to answer charges against
him. The rule which attempts to
prevent an actual conflict between
the two systems is that the court to
which jurisdiction first attaches,
whether it involves a person or
property, must be permitted to exhaust its action before the other
court can attach its jurisdiction to
the same matter. Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U. S. 506 (1858); Covell
v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176 (1884).
The leading case in this field is
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254
(1921), where the federal government waived its right of strict
custody and a committed individual was allowed to be tried in a
state court while under sentence
to a federal penitentiary. In a
fact situation like this it would be
impossible for the state authorities
to compel the federal government
to relinquish its custody since the
matter is one based entirely on
comity. Marsino v. Hogsett, 37 F.
(2d) 409 "(E. D. Mass. 1930).
In a recent case, In re Craig, 4
L. Wk. 495 (S. D. Ill. 1936), the

accused was convicted in a federal court and placed on probation
without any commitment to a
penal institution. It was there
held that the accused was not subject to prosecution in a state court
for a state offense, for this would

be an interference with the probationary power of the federal
court. This seems to be a considerable extension of immunity
from prosecution but is in accord
with the prior case of Grant v.
Guernsey, 63 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A.
10th, 1933). It was there said, on
the same facts, that the second
prosecution would be a direct interference with the jurisdiction of
the federal court and a violation
of the rule of comity between the
federal and state courts. However, Circuit Judge Cotteral in his
dissent argued that there would be
no actual -interference with the
probationary power of the federal
court and since the practice of subjecting prisoners to a second trial
is well settled, probation should
not prevent it. But if there were
a commitment after the second

trial there would undoubtedly be
a direct interference with the federal court's probationary power.
There would seem to be an immunity, though, where the accused is out on bail (Taylor v.
Taintor, 83 U. S. 366, 373 (1872);
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but see Metcalf v. State, 57 Okla.
64, 156 Pac. 305 (1916)); or where
he is in custody of the federal
court. Ableman v. Booth, supra;
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624
(1883).
Of course, the sovereignty having the exclusive jurisdiction may
waive its right and thus subject
the accused to another trial. The
right of retention of jurisdiction
or waiver thereof is one entirely
within the discretion of the sovereignty and the accused may not
raise the prior jurisdiction of one
court as a defense in a second
prosecution. U. S. v. Marrin, 227
Fed. 314 (E .D. Pa. 1915); Ponziv. Fessenden, supra. If the federal court does waive the right to
exclusive jurisdiction the accused
must be given a full opportunity
for defense and presence at the
second trial, or there is a denial of
due process. Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S. 309 (1915); Lewis v.
United States, 146 U. S. 370 (1892);
cf. Simmons v. State, 165 Miss. 732,
141 So. 288 (1932).
By statute, 26 STAT. 839 (1891),
amended by 46 STAT. 326 (1930),
18 U. S. C. A. §753f (1936 Supp.),
the attorney general is given control and custody of all prisoners
committed to federal penitentiaries
and it was under this statute that
the second prosecution was allowed by consent of the attorney
general in Ponzi v. Fessenden,
supra. However, the statute could
hardly be invoked to enable a
second prosecution in the Craig
case since there the attorney general had no custody because of no
commitment. Where the convicted
person is put on probation he remains in the custody of the court
and the only procedure by which
the state court could secure cus-
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tody would be by getting an order
from the federal court having such
control during the probationary
period. Cf. Ex parte Lamar, 274
Fed. 160 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
Wk. T. MORGAN, JR.

GAMING-SLOT MAcuNms-LoTTERMS-SLOT MACHIiNE STATUTES.-

[Massachusetts]
The defendant,
convicted of operating a lottery,
maintained a slot machine which
worked on the same principle as
commercial excavating cranes. Inside a glass compartment were
prizes placed on a bed of red candy
cinnamon drops, which the operator
of the machine attempted to secure
by setting the crane. After the
machine started into motion the
operator was powerless to control
the course of the crane. The defendant contended that this was a
game of skill and that he sought
to create a market for the articles
inside, which he manufactured.
The jury found, however, that the
element of skill was highly speculative and that the element of
chance predominated. Therefore,
since the defendant was attempting to dispose of his articles
through a game of chance, he was
properly convicted for running a
lottery. Commonwealth v. Plissner, 4 N. E. (2d) 241 (Mass. 1936).
The history of lotteries dates
back to the Romans. Some modern governments have run lottery
schemes to raise revenue, but the
original Roman lotteries were
purely for amusement. Nero gave
such prizes as a house or a slave.
France and Italy used lotteries
frequently before and after Louis
XIV. The first English lottery was
in 1569, but in the next century
they became so frequent that they
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were suppressed as public nuisances, and in 1826 they were
finally prohibited. Early America
looked upon lotteries with favor,
and before 1820 numerous acts of
Congress permitted lotteries to
raise money for public purposes.
(See Note, Lotteries and tke Law
(1924) 157 L. T. 480 for an outline of the history of lotteries.)
Modern law, however, adopts the
policy that lotteries are bad for
incite the
public morals -they
gambling instinct and prey upon
the poor. They are practically
everywhere denounced and prohibited by statute. Pickett, Contests and the Lottery Laws (1932)
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1196; Note, Contests of Skill and the Lottery Laws
(1937) 23 Va. L. Rev. 431.
Interesting though the study of
lotteries may be, this note is
primarily limited to a discussion
of the status of the slot machine
under the gaming and lottery laws.
A slot machine which merely
vends merchandise is not unlawful. Its illegality rests upon the
element of chance that the player
might receive something of greater
value than the coin used. If skill
is an essential element, then the
machine may possibly escape condemnation. Which of the elements of chance, skill and possibility of greater reward predominates in a given case is the problem to determine.
In England slot machines have
been held illegal under the general gaming statute, Section 4 of
the Gaming Houses Act of 1854,
17 & 18 VIcT., c. 38, where the
penalty imposed is £500, costs and
one year in prison. In Fielding v.
Turner, [1903] 1 K. B. 867, the
game in question consisted in putting a penny in a slot and releas-
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ing a spring which forced the
penny upward toward seven compartments. Depending upon the
compartment into which it fell the
player got a ticket entitling him
to twopennyworth of articles sold
in the shop, a return of the coin,
or its total loss. This device was
declared illegal. Cf. Thompson v.
Mason, 90 L. T. R. 649 (1904)
A
(penny operated by hand).
similar device which shot balls
into cups but which gave no right
to merchandise was also declared
illegal in Roberts v. Harrison, 101
L. T. R. 540 (1909). In each case
the element of skill was said to be
lacking. But although a person
might develop skill in catching a
ball in a sliding cup at the bottom of a device through which a
ball passes among many pins, the
probability was that few people
could attain that skill and such
was declared illegal, both in England and Ireland. Bracchi Bros. v.
Rees, 113 L. T. R. 871 (1915);
Donaghy v. Walsh, [1914] 2 Ir. R.
261. The Scotch saw nothing harmful in this game. Di Carlo v.
M'Intyre, [1914] S. C. (J.) 60.
"Diddler," much played in Ireland
a few years ago, was declared unlawful in Gordon v. Dunlevy,
[1928] Ir. R. 595. That machine
consisted of inserting a small disc
and pulling a lever, starting the
reels revolving. The player could,
by means of push-buttons, attempt
to control the speed of the reels
and make them stop on a winning
combination. The amount of skill
involved was held not sufficient;
the test was whether skill entered
into the game to such a substantial
extent as to be the predominating
element, and it was not to be tested
by the standard of experts, though
some might by practice insure
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success.

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
Cf.

Paul, Games

of

Chance (1935) 9 Australian L. J.
43, 46.
"Little Stockbroker"
sought to test one's skill by showing elaborate instructions for
operating, and if strictly followed
the chance of winning was fair.
The judge found, however, that
few players ever read the instructions, but instead took their
chances. The device was condened. Rex v. Brennard, 22 Cr.
App. Rep. 95, 74 S. J. 788 (1930).
In Scotland a machine which gave
discs of no value except for replaying the machine for amusement was legal where there was
no showing that it was used for
gambling. Crolla v. Macpherson,
[1931] S. C. (J.) 4.
Most American states have
general gaming laws broad enough
to cover gambling by slot machines and a few specifically make
mention of the machine itself. A
typical statute of the latter type
provides fine and imprisonment for
"whoever . . . keeps . . . any
clock, joker, tape or slot machine
or any other device upon which
money is staked or hazarded or
into which money is paid or played
upon chance, or upon the result of
the action of which money or other
valuable thing is staked, bet, hazarded, won or lost. . . ." ILL.
STATE BAR STATS. (1935) c. 38,
§321. Such a statute is constitutional. Bobel v. People, 173 Ill.
19, 50 N. E. 322 (1898). Most
courts agree that when the ma.
chine returns tokens exchangeable
for merchandise it is a gambling
device. People v. Kopper, 253 N.
Y. 83, 170 N. E. 501 (1930); see
Note, Slot Machines (1932) 66 U.
S. L. Rev. 63 for a review of the
cases. The fact that a card hung
on the machine, if studied, will en-

able the player to meet measurable success will not conceal its
gambling character-"the lure of
the game" is still present. Almy
Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, 202 Ill. App.
240 (1916). The apparently harmless "mint vending" machine,
where the tokens may be used only
for amusement in replaying the
machine, has practically everywhere met a similar fate. Jenner
v. State, 173 Ga. 86, 159 S. E. 564
(1931); Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192
Wis. 585, 213 N. W. 335 (1927);
contra: Oberly v. Oklahoma City,
46 Okla. Cr. Rep. 42, 287 Pac. 796
(11930).
The added amusement
feature is considered a "thing of
value." State ex rel. Manchester
v. Marvin, 211 Iowa 462, 233 N. W.
486 (1930) noted (1931) 22 J.
Crim. L. 282.
May these machines also be an
infringement of the lottery laws?
Three things are necessary to constitute a lottery-prize, chance and
consideration. If skill is present
there is no lottery, but in none of
the machines considered has the
element of skill been sufficient.
There can be no doubt that chance
is involved in each case. Consideration is present also -the
money necessary to run the machine. How about prize? The
machine in the present Massachusetts case clearly had that element, too, so it was condemned as
a lottery. Surely the element of
prize would be equally present
when the tokens are exchangeable
for merchandise. Such a scheme
should come within the statutory
definition "with intent to make the
disposal of such real or personal
property dependent upon or connected with any chance by . . .
game, hazard or other gambling
device, whereby such chance or

RECENT-CRIMINAL CASES

913

device is made an additional inducement to the disposal or sale
of said property." ILL. STATE BAR
STATS.

(1935)

c.

38,

§401.

Cf.

Loveland v. Bode, 214 Ill. App. 399
(191:9) (selling coupons contemplating redemption in merchandise
held a lottery); Commonwealth v.
McClintock, 257 Mass. 431, 154 N.
E. 264 (1926) (redeemable tokens). In the Almy Mfg. Co. case,
supra, the machine was so constituted as to pay from 5 cents to 25
cents for the nickel used. The
Illinois court said: "The machine
• . .is, we think, akin to a lottery,
in its operation, coming within the
definition of the lexicographers of
a lottery, which is, 'a scheme for
the distribution of prizes by lot or
chance.'" The ordinary slot machine which gives something more
than the equivalent in money or
money's worth of the amount inserted seems to offend the lottery
laws as well as the general gaming statutes. See Notes (1935) 80
L. J. 305, 306; (1933) 75 id. 130.
Cf. Jenner v. State, supra, where
the lottery clause was included in
the general gaming statute. It is
quite probable, though, that the
suppression of slot machines will
continue under the gaming laws or
the special slot machine laws, except in unusual cases such as the
present one where the lottery feature of the machine is quite evident.
The Canadian Provinces have
been divided as to just what sort
of machine fell within the general gaming laws. The devices
which gave redeemable tokens and
didn't require skill in operation
were generally held illegal. Rex
v. O'Meara, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 208
(Ont. 19f5), is the leading case
and was followed in Bareham v.

The King, 26 Can. Cr. Cas. 211
(K. B. Que. 1916); Rex v. Arnold,
48 id. 101 (Ont. 1927); Rex v.
Richards, 57 id. 208 (B. C. 1931).
The ordinary mint vending machine with non-redeemable tokens
was held legal by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Rex v. Wilkes,
[1931] 1 D. L. R. 995. Manitoba
held that a machine which could
be partially controlled by pushbuttons was not a lottery Rex. v.
Liptrot, 50 Can. Cr. Cas. 244
(1928), but the weight of authority is against this case. Rex v.
Wolfe, 50 id. 189 (Alb. 1928); Rex
v. Athonas, 56 id. 146 (Ont. 1931).
Where skill alone is determinative,
as in shooting a dime from a gun
into a target, releasing a pot of
dimes, there is no violation of the
statute. Rex v. Geffler, [1923] 3
D. L. R. 1205 (B. C.).
In the last two years several of
the provinces have gone the whole
way in outlawing slot machines.
Alberta had a Slot Machine Act
in 1924, but it was never enforced,
so she enacted a much broader
statute in 1935. Stats. of Alberta
1935, 25 GFo. V, c. 14. Manitoba
enacted a similar statute. Stats.
of Manitoba 1935, 25 GEO. V, c. 43.
See Legis., The Slot Machine Acts
(1936) 14 Can. B. Rev. 549, 553.
The Alberta statute was upheld in
Rex v. Stanley, [1936] 1 D. L. R.
100 (S. Ct. Alb.). In 1936 New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan enacted even broader
statutes:
New Brunswick 1936,
1 Evw. VIII, c. 48; Nova Scotia
1936, 1 Eaw. VIII, c. 2; Saskatchewan 1936, 1 EDW. VIII, c. 110, repealed by c. 11.
The statutes
seemingly are intended to cover
every conceivable type of slot machine, which is defined as "any
• . . device which [is operated by]
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. . . money, coin, token . . . or
other substance [with or without]
. . . any handle, lever, plunger
or other attachment [and which]
. . . delivers or returns or purports to deliver or return . .
with or without any article of
merchandise . . . any money,
premium, prize, reward, token,
counter, disc, slug, or any thing
which is intended to be or capable
of being exchanged for money or
money's worth or which may be
replayed or re-inserted in such
. . . device to again set it in
operation." Section 2 (b) of the
Manitoba Act, similar to all. This
definition would include all machines that returned tokens for
whatever purpose; the only machines exempted would be vending machines where nothing was
returned except the article worth
exactly the amount inserted-the
pure automatic vending machine.
To effectuate these Acts, property
rights are forbidden in the machines and they are subject to
seizure and forfeiture without
warrant when discovered.
Saskatchewan even made them government property outright. Such
drastic Acts are not likely to find
favor in the United States, nor
would they be adequately enforced.
CHARLES B. ROBISON.

JuRoRs - CoNsuruToNAIry OF
STATUTE MAKING
FEDERAL
EmPLOyES ELIGIBLE.-[Federal]
At

common law challenges were made
either to the array or to the polls.
Challenges to the polls were either
in principal, which worked an absolute disqualification, or challenges to favor, which disqualified
for actual bias. That there was no
settled practice at common law

absolutely disqualifying
Crown
servants as jurors is disclosed by
early commentators. FITZHERBERT,
ABRIDGEMENT, Challenge, §§17, 63,
65, folios 172, 173 (1577 Ed.);
STAUNFORDE,

PLEAS OF THE CROWN,

162; 2 HAWKxNs, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN, c. 43, §§32, 33; 5 BACON,
ABRIDGEMENT, Juries 355.
This is
supported by the early cases. Rex
v. Genney, Keilw. 102a (1508);
Rex v. Parkyns, 13 St. Tr. f63
(1695); The King v. Edmonds, 4
B. & Ald. 471 (1821); Reg. v.
Lacey, 3 Cox Cr. C. 517, 519
(1848).
Blackstone's Commentaries were
doubtless familiar to the framers
of the Constitution, being accepted
as the most satisfactory exposition
of the common law of England.
Schick v. United States, 195 U. S.
65, 69 (1903). Blackstone's statement as to the grounds of a principal challenge has relation to
master and servants between private parties; there is no mention
made of the practice in Crown
cases where Crown servants are
jurors. 3 Bl. Com. 363. This
omission is not a sufficient basis
for denying the existence of an
exception in Crown cases, nor
that the colonies followed a rule
different from that of England.
The question of government employes acting as jurors was first
presented to the Supreme Court
of the United States in Crawford
v. United States, 212 U. S. 183
(1908). That was a prosecution
in the District of Columbia by the
federal government for conspiracy
to defraud relative to a contract
with the postal department. One
of the jurors challenged was a
druggist who received $300 a year
as compensation for maintaining a
subpostal station. The Court, con-
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sidering the section of the Code of
Laws of the District (D. C. Code
1929, T. 18, §§357, 360) which exempted salaried officers of the
government from jury service, expressed the opinion that the provisions therein did not embrace
the entire subject of disqualifications, that by the common law all
servants of the government would
be disqualified and that this was
required by the use of the phrase
"an impartial jury" in the Sixth
Amendment. In 1935 Congress
sought to change the result of the
Crawford case by making government employes available for jury
service. 49 STAT. 682. The constitutionality of this statute was
attacked in Wood v. United States,
83 F. (2d) 587 (1936). Defendant
was convicted in the Police Court
of the District for petit larceny
from a private corporation. After
defendant's peremptory challenges
were exhausted, there remained on
the jury the recipient of a Civil
War pension and two clerks employed in the Treasury Department and the Navy Yard. Each
of the challenges against these
persons upon the ground of interest in the government was disallowed. The court of appeals reversed the judgment, one judge
dissenting. The majority opinion,
following the Crawford case, stated
that all doubt had been foreclosed
on.the subject. Robb, dissenting,
distinguished the Crawford case,
saying that there was no statutory
provision present in that case inconsistent with the common law
rule which he believed was correctly stated by Blackstone. He
concluded that the amendment
was constitutional. Both the majority and dissent recognized that
the statute if valid removed the
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disqualification of more than 100,000 employes. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court, reviewing the
common law authorities, denied
that an absolute disqualification of
government servants existed. On
the basis of this research and in
the absence of a different practice
in the colonies, the Court refused
to follow the Crawford case, and
reversed. Wood v. United States,
57 S. Ct. 177 (1936). The Crawford case could have been distinguished on its facts, since there
the employe was in the very department where the alleged conspiracy took place, but the Court
admits that that decision rested on
a broader ground. Thus, for all
practical purposes the Crawford
case is overruled.
As an alternative ground for its
decision the Court stated that even
if it could be said that at common
law an absolute disqualification
existed, Congress had the power
to remove it. The question thus
arises whether ar, absolute disqualification of government employes is essential to the impartiality of the jury. In Patton v.
United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288
(1930), the essential elements of
trial by jury were set forth: "(1)
that the jury should consist of
twelve men, neither more nor less;
(2) that the trial by jury should be
in the presence ... of a judge having power to instruct them as to
the law and advise them in respect
of the facts; and (3) that the verdict should be- unanimous." In a
leading case it was held that the
command of the Seventh Amendment that the right of jury trial
shall be. preserved does not require that old forms of practice
and procedure be retained. Ex
parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 309
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(1920). The principle there enunour course of legal development
ciated that "new devices may be
will lead courts to ultimately deal
used to adapt the ancient instituwith a statutory innovation by
tion to present needs and to make holding it of superior authority to
of it an efficient instrument in the judge-made rules on the same
general subject. Pound, Common
administration of justice" is apparent in Stilson v. United States, Law and Legislation (1908) 21
250 U. S. 583 (1919) where the Harv. L. Rev. 383. The Supreme
number of peremptory challenges
Court is cognizant of this prinwas limited. In Tynan v. United ciple: "And what courts can thus
States, 297 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 9th, do to assure the appropriate
1924) and Hoxie v. United States, growth and adaptation of the law
15 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 9th, a fortiori can be achieved by the
1926), it was decided that women action of a competent Legiswere qualified to serve as jurors lature." 57 S. Ct. at 184.
though not so permitted at comState courts enforcing requiremon law. Also, the wife of a dements of state constitutions as to
fendant in a federal criminal case
trial by jury have allowed legislamay act as a competent witness in tures considerable freedom in eshis behalf. Funk v. United States, tablishing qualifications for jury
290 U. S. 371 (1933); Note (1935)
service, though these involve de47 Harv. L. Rev. 853. The reaparture from common law rules.
soning of those cases arising under Privitt v. St. Louis-San Francisco
the Seventh Amendment is ap- Ry. Co., 300 S. W. 726 (Mo. 1927);
plicable under the Sixth AmendEx Parte Mana, 178 Cal. 213, 172
ment. Springlield v. Thomas, f66 Pac. 986 (1918); Brown v. State,
U. S. 707 (1896).
62 N. J. 666, 42 Atl. 811 (1899);
As is stated by the court in the Coughlin v. People, 144 Ill. 140, 33
Wood case, the Constitution lays N. E. 1 (1893); Spies v. Ill., 123 U.
down no particular tests, and proS. 131, 167, 169 (1887); Stokes v.
cedure is not confined to any anPeople, 53 N. Y. 164 (1873). The
cient and artificial formula. "The court in the Wood case, in its refucommon law is not immutable but tation of the argument that a govflexible and by its own principle ernment employe would be a
adapts itself to varying condibiased juror against the accused,
tions."
Funk v. United States, admits that bias is an elusive consupra; see also von Moschzisker, dition of the mind but states that
The Common Law and Our Fed- such a juror probably would be
eral Jurisprudence (1925) 74 U. no more biased than an ordinary
of Pa. L. Rev. 109, 388. It is true citizen. The only test as to the
that statutes in derogation of the competency of a juror should be
common law have been generally
whether he is under such an instrictly construed and the courts fluence as to prevent an unbiased
have been hesitant to utilize them weighing of the evidence. Tuggle
as authority for overthFowing v. State, 22 Okla. Cr. Rep. 1 209
principles of long standing, but the Pac. t84 (1922). The influence ought
common law system must often- not be imputed on any extreme or
times give way to legislative policy. fanciful tests. There is no doubt
In fact, it has been submitted that but that the Act of 1935 was passed
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words "set aside and dismissed"
were mere surplusage. People v.
Vitale, 5 N. E. (2d) 474 (Ill. 1936).
Under the common law the state
has no right to sue out a writ of
error upon a judgment in favor
of the defendant in a criminal action, whether rendered upon a verdict of acquittal or upon the determination of the court on a preliminary question of law or fact.
United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S.
310 (1892); People v. Bork, 78 N.
Y. 346 (1879). Prior to 1700, the
decision of a trial court in a criminal case was final. See Miller,
PROCEDURE-RIGHT OF STATE TO Appeals by the State in Criminal
Cases (1926) 36 Yale L. J. 486. In
AN APPEAL OR WRIT OF ERROR UNTen septhe absence of a statute, no appeal
DER STATUTE.-[Illinois]
arate indictments were returned was permitted either to defendant
(cf. State v. Googins, 115 Me. 373,
against defendant for the murder
374, 98 Atl. 1032 (1916)); or to the
of ten persons by burning a dwelling. He was found guilty by jury state (United States v. Evans, 213
and sentenced on one of the inU. S. 297 (1909); People v. Royal, 2
dictments. Thereafter he was called Ill. 557 (1839); St. Paul v. Stamm,
106 Minn. 81, 118 N. W. 154 (1908);
to trial on the remaining nine indictments, and to each he filed a State v. Davidson, 124 N. C. 839,
32 S. E. 957 (1899)), whether after
plea of autrefois convict. Overruling the People's demurrer, the conviction or acquittal. In Engcourt entered judgment dischargland, however, an appeal was often
ing defendant and ordered that the granted to the defendant as a matindictments be "set aside and dis- ter of grace. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr.
missed." The People sued out a 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770). Subse-.
quently, a writ of error came to be
writ of error under the 1933
amendment to the Criminal Code regarded as a matter of right when
which provides that "The people there was a possibility of an error
may sue out writs of error to reof law in the rulings of the trial
court. See Miller, supra. The
view any order or judgment quashing or setting aside an indictment passage of the English Criminal
or information." ILL. STATE BAR Appeal Act of 1907, 7 EDW. VII, c.
STATS. (f935) c. 38, §770. Appeal 23, §3, made clear the right of the
dismissed. Held: The statute is defendant to an appeal from a conlimited to those cases in which the viction and sentence. The laws of
trial court has quashed or set aside England do not, however, provide
the indictment. Here the ruling of for appeal or writs of error on the
the court was, in .legal effect, that part of the prosecution, except
prosecution was barred under the that appeals on points of law may
indictments, not an adjudication
be taken in exceptional cases from
that the indictments were bad. The decisions of the Court of Criminal

to meet a public need and that no
interference with the actual impartiality of the jury was contemplated. H. R. Rep. No. 1421; Sen.
Rep. 1297, 74 Cong., 1st Sess. The
court recognizes that certain crimes
may be of peculiar interest to employes of certain governmental departments. In such a case, the law
permits full inquiry as to actual
bias. 57 S. Ct. at 187; Priestly v.
State, 19 Ariz. 371, 374 (1918);
Tuggle v. State, supra.
EUGENE A. BUSCH.
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Appeal to the House of Lords. The court said, "the right should be
CRimINAL APPEAL ACT §1 (6).
See
seldom exercised, and never for
also Miller, supra, at 491. The oppression or without necessity."
only case in which the Crown may Id. at 330. There have been debe permitted a new trial is where cisions to the same effect in a few
fraud has been practised by the other jurisdictions. Thus the conaccused, such as keeping witnesses tention has been made that the
for the Crown in seclusion.
state has a common law right to
The common law of this counappeal both in England and in the
try, however, never recognized the United States. See Johnson, The
early English practice, and granted
Right of the State to Sue Out a
the defendant the right to a new Writ of Error in Criminal Cases
trial or a writ of error in a crim(1933) 11 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 85.
inal case. United States v. Sanges,
Jurisdictions which permit an
supra. It is now generally held appeal by the state vary as to the
that upon judgment for the descope and as to when the right
fendant on demurrer the writ will may be exercised. In some jurisnot lie (United States v. Sanges, dictions the state may have as
supra; Commonwealth v. Cum- broad a right to appeal as the demings, 3 Cush. 212 (Mass. 1849);
fendant.
Connecticut, under a
People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9 statute giving the state the same
(1884)) unless granted by statute. right as the accused to appeal on
People v. Apple, 57 Cal. App. 110, all questions of law arising in a
206 Pac. 487 (1913); People v. Zocriminal case, adopts the view that
bel, 54 Colo. 284, 130 Pac. 837 even after an acquittal the state
(1913); State v. Robertson, 28 may appeal, or in case of a reversal,
Okla. Cr. Rep. 234, 230 Pac. 932
may bring the defendant into court
(1924); State v. Spencer, 37 S. D. again for a new trial. CoNN. GEN.
219, 157 N. W. 662 (1916). Even STAT. (1930) §6494; State v. Lee,
when a stautory provision exists, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 111'0 (1894).
it is construed strictly against the At the other extreme are those
state. State v. Raymond, 18 Colo. states which allow no right of ap242, 32 Pac. 429 (1893); State v. peal whatsoever. Such is the rule
Northrup, 13 Mont. 522, 35 Pac. in Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts,
228 (1893); State v. Weathers, 13 Minnesota, and Texas. See CurOkla. Cr. Rep. 92, 162 Pac. 239 ran and Sunderland, The Organi(1917).
zation and Operation of Courts of
The practice of issuing a writ of Review, Third Report of the Juerror on behalf of the state is not dicial Council of Michigan (1933)
a common one. See Note (1935)
51, 211. See also Orfield, Appeal
4 Fordham L. Rev. 130. A Maryby the State in Criminal Cases
land case is the first reported de(1935) 15 Ore. L. Rev. 306. In
cision on this subject in this counMinnesota, the state is not pertry. In that case a writ of error
mitted to appeal or seek a review
by the state was allowed though in a criminal case at any time or
no statute permitted it, after the under any circumstances even on
county court had sustained a dea point of law arising prior to trial.
murrer to the indictment. State v. See Miller, supra, at 486. Between
Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317 (Md. 1821).
these two extremes, the state may
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be entitled to appeal from various rulings of the court, not however in such a way as to effect an
acquittal. Curran and Sunderland
refer to twenty such states. Twenty-one are listed in Note (1933)
10 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 373. Usually such appeal is from an order
setting aside or quashing an indictment or information, from an order sustaining a demurrer, from
an order in arrest of judgment, or
from an order granting a new trial.
See Orfield, supra. Many state
statutes provide that the state may
appeal from an order granting a
new trial. See Note (1933) 8f U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 340, 341, n. 4. The
Federal Criminal Appeal Act permits the government to appeal by
writ of error from a decision or
judgment quashing, setting aside
or sustaining a demurrer to any
indictment where such decision or
judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the
statute upon which the indictment
is founded; from an arrest of judgment of conviction for insufficiency
of the indictment when the validity or construction of the statute is
in issue; and from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar, when
defendant is not put in jeopardy.
34 STAT. 1246 (1907), 18 U. S. C.
A. 682 (1927).
The reason most frequently
given by the courts for refusing
the state the right to appeal is that
to do so would result in placing
the defendant in double jeopardy.
Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S.
100 (1904). This objection, however, is only applicable to appeals
from verdicts of acquittal. It does
not apply to appeals from an order of the court quashing an indictment or sustaining a demurrer
to it. The defendant has not been
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put in jeopardy, since no jury has
been sworn. The objection does
not apply even after acquittal, if
the decision on appeal is simply
to determine the law in future
cases. It does not apply from an
order granting a new trial, nor
from an order in arrest of judgment, nor from a ruling on a question of law adverse to the state
when the defendant was convicted
and appeals from the judgment,
nor from the sentence. See Orfield, supra. It should be noted
that five states, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Vermont, do not have a
double jeopardy provision in their
constitutions.
In Illinois prior to 1933 a writ of
error did not lie dn behalf of the
state in criminal cases. People v.
Glodo, 12 Ill. App. 348 (1883);
People v. Dill, 2 Ill. 257 (1836).
It was held in People v. Royal, 2
Ill. 557 (1839), that the double
jeopardy provision in the Constitution prohibits the state from
bringing a writ of error where a
person accused of a crime is acquitted in the court below. In
People v. Barber,348 Ill. 40 (1932)
noted (1933) 23 J. Crim. L. 1039,
the court held that the People
could not have a writ of error to
review a judgment quashing an
indictment even though there was
no contention that the defendant
was put in jeopardy prior to the
judgment. In People v. Kopman,
358 Ill. 479, 1'93 N. E. 516 (1934),
the court, in allowing an appeal
from an order quashing the indictment, said, "The legislation in 1933
was remedial and intended to supply those defects in the law which
prevented a review of an order
quashing an indictment." Cf. People v. Williamson, 290 Ill. App. 93
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(1935), where an appeal was taken
from a judgment quashing an indictment.
There may be valid reasons why
the People in criminal prosecutions should not be debarred from
the benefits given defendants. But
in the instant case, since the demurrer put in issue only the validity of the plea in bar, the sustain-

ing of the plea, while to all
practical effects amounting to a
quashing of the indictment, did
not clearly fall within the language
of the statute. The statute being
in derogation of the strict common law rules, it is for the legislature rather than for the court to
broaden the right of the People to
appeal.
MAX M. FLEisHr.

